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ABSTRACT
Visual imagery is integral to creative achievements in many fields, facilitating both the
creative process and the public reception of the work. Certain images have been repeated
or recreated by the individuals working in these domains. The process of repetition has
been relatively unencumbered by spatial or temporal distances between appearances of
the imagery, suggesting that people incorporating these images into their work prefer
certain universal forms, or that these people have a propensity to choose certain forms.
Preferences for typical and atypical image and symbol forms, considering personality
preferences and orientations that might suggest reasons for individual differences in
image preference and creativity, were studied to discern how they facilitate the reuse and
modification of visual images. Participants high in creativity were expected to have
higher image preferences than those low in creativity, especially for images with
properties that are congruent with objective or subjective creativity measures.
Participants with higher introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving tendencies were
expected to be more creative and have higher image preferences, as were participants
with high levels of both skepticism and belief. Analyses demonstrated that participants
preferred typical, gestalt-type images to those without gestalt form qualities, although
previous exposure increased participants’ preferences for non-gestalt images.
Relationships between image preference and creativity were weak, but personality type
did relate to creativity as measured indirectly by figure preference, and interactions
between skepticism and belief yielded higher indirect creativity scores and total image
preferences.

PERSONALITY QUALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH VISUAL IMAGE
PREFERENCE AND CREATIVITY

Introduction

Visual images and symbols are essential in the creation and transmission of ideas
and experiences. The development of new symbol systems is integral to the progress of
the domains in which these systems are generated. Visual images are readily created and
used to present or represent a concept or convey an impression. Some images persist
predominantly unchanged through many uses, whereas others undergo alterations in form
or content during their repetitions.
Numerous images and symbols have been repeated in the creation of new images
and symbols. Some recreations or forms are the same only in structure, whereas others
are similar in structure and content to previously-created images. Some images may be
more readily recreated than others. Perhaps these images are better perceived and
recognized, making them more familiar to the perceiver. Creative endeavors involving
imagery therefore would result from the reuse of recognizable images. If the selection of
imagery and symbols is dependent on the person creating, then the repetition of forms
suggests that creative people have a propensity to use similar images in their work. The
probability of coincidental repetition is unlikely, and it is not a useful theory with which
to explain all occurrences of recurrent imagery. It is more likely that personal variables
predispose some people to prefer certain images or that certain images are more readily
available and familiar to everyone. A combination of these possibilities is a more
comprehensive explanation.
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In this study, I examine the idea that people are predisposed to prefer images that
possess certain qualities of form over images that lack these qualities and that people
measuring high in creativity will have a stronger preference for all types of images.
Creativity researchers have consistently maintained that a product or idea is deemed
“creative” by virtue of both its novelty or originality and its utility or acceptability in a
validated context (Amabile & Tighe, 1993; Feist, 1993; Gruber & Wallace, 1999;
Koestler, 1964). These qualities might be reflected in creative individuals’ preferences
for visual images, so that they will prefer images with form qualities to those without, but
will show stronger preferences than their less-creative peers for images with altered form
qualities. Possible evolutionary explanations and visual mechanisms describing why and
how these events might occur provide a theoretical background for the expected
outcomes. Personality preferences and orientations suggest reasons for individual
differences in image preference and creativity. These facets of images and of people who
create and use them are studied to discern how they facilitate the reuse and modification
of visual images in a wide variety of times and locations.
Jung contributed some of the most comprehensive scholarship on the topic of
symbol and image persistence across time and distance with his discovery and description
of the collective unconscious as a prominent structure in the individual's mind and
personality (Campbell, 1971; Jung, 1936). The collective unconscious is a repository of
latent images or forms inherited from the recent and distant past. People do not
consciously experience these images; rather, the images are pre-existent forms without
content, provisions for a predisposed way of perceiving and acting toward certain
experiences and things within the environment. These things, when encountered, bring
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the archetypal images into conscious awareness by their identification through the
original, primordial model (Jung, 1936). The repetition of experiences throughout time
and space has strengthened the establishment of specific images as potential forms for the
experiences of future generations. Although the exact expression of these potentials is
dependent upon the individual's experience, the prospect of expression is innate, and Jung
believed, inherited by one generation from the learning of its progenators (Hall &
Nordby, 1973; Jung, 1936).
The evolution of the collective unconscious could be explained not only by the
inheritance of acquired characteristics, but also through the mechanism of natural
selection of a biological nature, the evolution of the brain (Hall & Nordby, 1973). The
archetypes of the collective unconscious could then be considered referents to selected
patterns of perception and behavior, as well as structural images that the brain has
evolved to recognize and recreate. The evolution of these pattem-recognition capacities
will be clarified with a broad description of the mechanisms of visual processing.
Briefly, aspects of a visual scene are processed not in a sequential, serial fashion
through a hierarchical system (although information about these features is necessarily
conveyed serially as complexity and integration build) but in parallel, with information of
different features transmitted through parallel pathways from the retina to the involved
cortical regions (Zeki, 1998). The parallel nature of visual processing emphasizes the
reassembly of a visual image from the input of separate feature-detecting brain areas that
process components such as line orientation, motion, shape, and color (Zeki, 1998).
Hypercolumns, the divisions of the primary visual cortex that respond to line orientation,
are organized according to their receptivity to lines of varying orientations, such that an
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angle of a certain degree measure activates a different group (or groups) of neurons than
an angle of another degree (Hubei & Wiesel, 1979). Forms with line orientations that
closely "match" those to which the receptive cells maximally respond produce a greater
response in the cells than line orientations that diverge from the optimal levels of
response (Hubei & Wiesel, 1959). However, because of connections among groups of
cells possessing the same response properties, a cell's response can be influenced by
stimuli outside of its receptive field, and perception of an object therefore depends on the
context in which it is presented (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1989). In addition, response to visual
images can be heightened by amplifications of form qualities so that images with only the
most essential features result in greater response and preference than similar images that
are more familiar to the perceiver but less representative in form (Ramachandran &
Blakeslee, 1998). Implications for the use of these perceptual principles as strategies for
attentional capture suggest that images that closely adhere to the anatomical and
physiological predispositions of the visual system are most likely to receive attention and
to be replicated in modified forms.
The contemporary understanding of visual perception as a creative process has
been guided by reference to gestalt perceptual principles of wholeness and integration
(Kandel, 1991). The reassembly of an image is not an exact representation of the actual
image viewed. Previously developed perceptual knowledge and processes affect the
perceived result of visual processing; perception is guided by organizational principles
that enable the viewer to recognize patterns rather than fragments of an image.
Wertheimer (1945) called the most easily discernible of these patterns "gestalts," as a
referent to the wholeness of organization resulting from the ease with which the pattern's
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parts are connected. Gestalt psychology is predicated on the idea that people recognize
relations among individual parts of an image as having form quality (Miller, 1996).
Certain principles of perceptual organization, such as proximity, similarity, continuation,
closure, and symmetry, guide perception, making forms that possess these qualities more
discemable than those that do not. These principles are utilized by the visual system
such that incoming visual information is processed and reconstructed by their patterns
(Miller, 1996). Gestalt-type figures, or figures with gestalt properties of line orientation,
therefore tend to be organized in patterns to which the relevant cells in the hypercolumns
are maximally receptive and responsive. Images possessing the characteristics of a
gestalt might be more perceptible and therefore more readily reusable in creative
endeavors. In addition to describing the characteristic structure of gestalt form,
Wertheimer emphasized the structure to be found within a situation or context by a
creator, and analogized this process to the emergence of perceptual properties
(Wertheimer, 1945).
Recent thought on the evolution of the mind has focused attention toward the idea
that perceptual patterns and capacities have evolved as either a product or a byproduct of
the necessity of limiting the finite amount of focused awareness available to an infinite
amount of information (Mithen, 1996; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). Without this
function, the perceiver would be overwhelmed by a changing and undifferentiated
amalgam of potentially unessential stimuli. Attention is given to those images that are
most relevant and salient in the personal environment. "Extraneous" perceptions are
discarded. When the process is routinized such that information from stimuli in the
environment is interpreted within the framework of these perceptual patterns, the
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interpretations given to new information may be represented symbolically to connect or
associate them with prior knowledge and meanings. The capacity to symbolize involves
the ability to combine knowledge from previously unrelated, or apparently unrelated,
domains to create a referent with regard to which the new information will be associated.
Mi then (1996) argues that cognitive fluidity, an associative capacity that includes the
ability to make connections and perform symbolic activities, is the property that
distinguishes the modem mind from those of previous evolutionary stages.
Pattern recognition enables the association of old and new information, and a
cognitively-fluid ability to create symbol and metaphor among perceptions and
interpretations of stimuli enables the modem mind to make associations among domains
of knowledge that previously would have been incongruent (Mithen, 1996). These
connections strengthen the persistence of the involved patterns.
The evolution of pattern recognition and creation capacities involves common
cognitive and perceptual mechanisms, but not all people are equally creative in their use
of visual images. Individual differences in personality type may predispose some people
to greater affinity for and creative use of visual images.
Jung's theory of personality type as interpreted by Myers and Briggs presents four
dichotomous categories from which a dynamic personality preference is comprised
(Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998). The four dichotomous categories are
opposite domains of mental functioning, and include opposite ways of perceiving
(sensation and intuition), opposite ways of judging (thinking and feeling), opposite
attitudes in which preferred judgement and preferred perception are typically used

(judgement and perception), and opposite ways of relating to the world (extraversion and
introversion).
Because their patterns of orientation are more novel, images with altered gestalt
characteristics, operationally termed non-gestalt images, invite a more subjective
evaluation than do those images with intact gestalt properties. Different personality type
preferences could be expected to demonstrate different levels of preference for gestalt
and non-gestalt images. Jung described his type preferences as having objective and
subjective poles (Jung, 1971). The objective poles are extraversion, sensing, and
thinking, and the subjective are introversion, intuition, and feeling. A succinct
description of each will suggest why people differing in their preferences for these poles
might differ also in their image preferences.
Someone with a preference for extraversion orients himself or herself to people,
objects, and experiences in the external environment, whereas a person preferring an
introverted attitude values the internal, subjective state, focusing on ideas and concepts.
People with a preference for sensing as their predominant function of knowledge
acquisition apprehend the immediate qualities of experience as observed by the senses.
They are therefore usually attuned to the readily-observable and concrete reality of the
present moment. Those preferring intuition are apt to prefer potential patterns and
meanings in events, and are therefore more attuned to future possibilities, including
theoretical and abstract relationships, than present actualities. Objectivity and
impartiality in decision making and a logical evaluation of knowledge and ideas
characterize a thinking disposition. Feeling preferences reflect tendencies toward
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decision making in accord with relative, subjective values that are personally important to
the decision maker and to those whom the decision will affect (Myers et al, 1998).
Briggs and Myers furthered Jung's work in the area of preferred orientations to the
outer world by developing the fourth dichotomy, judging-perceiving. People preferring
the perceiving function spend more time observing and gathering information before
reaching a decision, whereas those among whom judgement is preferred are quicker to
make decisions based on available information (Myers et al, 1998).
A person's preference for different means of apprehending and comprehending
information and for orienting himself or herself to the world might affect perception,
preference, and creative use of images, particularly those images displaying gestalt
principles of perceptual organization. People with intuitive preferences have shown more
interest in fantasy and imagery than have sensing types (Ireland & Keman-Schloss, 1983;
O'Haire & Marcia, 1980; Palmiere, 1972), attributable in part to the greater tendency of
intuitive types to attempt to suspend time (Myers, et al, 1998). Intuition has been defined
as an initially-unaware perception of coherence in pattern, meaning, or form (Bowers,
Regher, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). Considering the preferences of creative people for
novelty as a means of mental stimulation (Houston & Mednick, 1963), intuition, as the
function most involved with perception and response to previously unconnected or
unrealized patterns, it is the preference most associated with creative potential (Myers, et
al).
Hall and McKinnon (1969) evaluated the proportion and degree of preference of
intuition among three groups of architects, and found that both the proportion of intuitive
types and the degrees of preference for intuition were highest among the architects
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deemed highly creative, and were higher among those working with the highly creative
architects than for a matched sample of control architects. Evidence for higher
preferences for intuition among creative people is augmented by the consideration that
the general population predominantly prefers sensing, at an approximate estimate of 75%
to 25% (Myers, et al, 1998).
The curiosity and receptiveness to new information and situations attendant with
the perceiving function enhance creativity in circumstances requiring an innovative
response, but relationships between creativity and the extraversion/introversion and
thinking/feeling scales are less definitive, and probably exhibit greater fluctuation among
domains (Myers, et al, 1998).
People preferring the subjective poles of introversion, intuition, feeling and
perceiving might prefer the congruently-subjective qualities of non-gestalt images, which
require the viewer to appropriate more attention to novel configurations that require more
perceptual effort than the readily-perceived gestalt images. People open to new
experiences have demonstrated higher preferences for abstract art than people low in
openness (Brady, 2000), and openness to experience has correlated strongly with
intuition and marginally with perception (McCrae & Costa, 1989), supporting the
contention that the attributes of curiosity and receptiveness associated with perceiving
and innovation associated with intuition are related to a preference for theoretical and
abstract relationships.
Skepticism and belief also involve orientations toward knowledge and preferred
ways of responding to external information. Individual differences in preference for a
source of knowledge, means of apprehending and comprehending information, and
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behaving in response to information gathered should be related to the characteristic
orientation that a person displays in his or her preferences and creative abilities. As
orientations toward knowledge, skepticism is characterized by science-mindedness, or an
affinity for the empirical processes and contents of science, and belief refers to openness
to or endorsement of unusual or extraordinary paranormal or religious ideas.
Jung (1971) suggests that external objects of empirical observation dominate
traditional conceptions of science. Information is gathered, processed, and used in the
simplest and most parsimonious arrangement possible. Preference for the immediacy of
external objects and experience unencumbered by concepts is considered a hallmark of
empiricism, and thus the object-oriented thinker is characterized by skepticism toward the
subjective, non-empirical qualities of idea and theory.
Jung places religious life and practice in the subjective, rational realm, stating that
religion has become dominated by the subjective idea since science has replaced religion
as the external, objective fact (Jung, 1971). Science-mindedness is reliant on external
linear processes of cause and effect, but belief and religion, as rationally important,
subjective ideas, are free from the determinism that is attendant with the more objective
orientations. Jung suggests that an idea can be assimilative, whereas facts require
categorization. Association and elaboration are favored over congruent and efficient
expression.
These orientations toward knowledge and information have implications for
image perception and creative behavior. Reliance on observable data might predispose
people to prefer images that are more pattern-congruent, converge on simplicity, and
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provide the most parsimonious arrangement of available information. Such images may
be "workable" tools for scientific thought, rather than forms of subjective expression.
Preference for subjective ideas, represented internally, might relate to a preference
for assimilation of imagery, such that patterns are rearranged or reformed in novel
combinations that increase their visual complexity by diverging from common form
qualities. Subjective preferences associated with religion and belief would be free from,
or would extend beyond, preferences constrained by convergence on pattern congruency
and simplicity.
Although empiricism and subjectivity continue to be associated with traditional
attitudes toward science/skepticism and religion/belief, respectively, changing thought
and paradigm shifts in the sciences have produced different attitudes toward the
enterprise and practice of science. For example, the shift from the idea of conceiving the
mind as an initially-blank receptacle for sensory experience to one espousing more active
cognitive mechanisms for the reception and organization of experience emphasizes
abstractions from perception and thought that are characteristic internal and subjective
representations of ideas. The subject matter and the processes of science both have
become more reliant on speculative interpretations of theory and data. Scientific work is
therefore more dependent on the internal representations of its practitioners during such
paradigm shifts.
Shifting trends in science are complemented by periods of increased efforts to
"scientize" religion, or bring an objective, scientific orientation to traditionally-subjective
religious ideas. Given these juxtapositions of content and approach to science and
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religion, a standard personality profile of a classic "skeptic" or "believer" will be
untenable.
Interactions among degrees and types of skepticism and belief might produce an
orientation toward information and an evaluation of content that is not characteristic
solely of a typical reliance on observable data or belief-focused value of subjective ideas
and representations. For some people, then, the domains of religion and science are
inherently mutually contradicting. For some, religion and science ask and suggest
answers to different types of questions, and for others, the methods of approach to
science and religion and the content of each are more flexible, and therefore more
amenable to mutual interaction.
Skepticism and belief can be measured along two unipolar dimensions, resulting
in combinations of high and low skepticism and belief for each person. People
possessing high levels of both skepticism and belief have demonstrated greater
integrative complexity in their responses to three domain-specific questions (Stemme &
Feist, 1999), indicating that they were better able to differentiate and integrate different
dimensions of thought when considering a problem. The ability to recombine ideas into a
unique synthesis of thought may parallel creative abilities in visual imagery tasks, and
different levels of skepticism and belief may influence or interact with image preference.
People for whom the constructs of skepticism and belief interact might also demonstrate
greater fluidity of thought when requested to "converge" on a correct response to a given
problem and "diverge" into novel constructions or recombinations of visual images.
Physiological and anatomical findings lend credence to the involvement of
skepticism and belief orientations in image preference and creativity. Visual imagery is
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associated with right hemispheric cortical activation (Martindale, 1999; Penfield &
Roberts, 1958), as are quasi-hallucinatory experiences (Jaynes, 1976). An increase in
differential activation of the right hemisphere is associated with religious experience and
belief (Persinger, 1993). This suggests a common mechanism or common activation for
perception of visual images and anomalous experiences that might lend themselves to
extraordinary belief.
Greater right-hemispheric activation during tasks requiring a creative response is
associated with higher levels of creativity (Martindale, Hines, Mitchell, & Covello,
1984). Relatively high degrees of extraordinary belief may be related to aspects of
creativity that require divergence from normative patterns, perceptions, and organizations
of information. Logical, analytical thought processes are associated with left-hemisphere
activation (Kupfermann, 1991). Skeptics have been shown to have higher critical
thinking ability than believers (Alcock & Otis, 1980), possibly due to a scientific bias.
Katz (1986) found that the most creative individuals in a domain or profession
show dominance in the hemisphere that is contralateral to that most notably used in their
work, and suggests that their creativity results from the addition of abilities from the
contralateral hemisphere. Some people regarded for their scientific genius have been
noted as having a high degree of skepticism toward traditional ideas coupled with openmindedness toward novel ideas (Koestler, 1964). Perhaps the disposition toward
skepticism provides the basis for the evaluative thought necessary to converge on an
appropriate solution to a problem, and when combined with a high degree of belief,
results in a combination that facilitates both convergent and divergent thought. Creative
people have demonstrated greater asymmetry of cortical activation, dependent on the task
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or stage of creative process, than have less creative control subjects (Martindale et al,
1984). Asymmetry of activation may be related to the formation of combined skeptic and
belief orientations.
People who possess a high degree of both skepticism and belief may be better
able to develop the associative thinking processes necessary to combine originality and
context-dependent usefulness in the generation of creative products. They would also be
expected to show high preferences for both gestalt images (convergent, pattern-congruent
forms) and non-gestalt images (divergent alterations of form), in keeping with the
emphasis on familiarity and novelty.
Because creative achievements maintain an association with previous work and
must be acknowledged by the field in which the work is evaluated (Csikszentmihalyi,
1988), the qualities and preferences of people deemed creative are not entirely discrepant
from those of their less-creative peers. The images preferences expressed by participants
may differ in degree, but not direction, between more- and less-creative people.
Therefore, all people are expected to prefer gestalt images to non-gestalt images.
Mednick (1962) proposed that the creative thinking process involves combining
remote elements in a way that is useful or fitting to specific criteria. A person’s ability to
associate remote aspects of a problem depends on the presence and conceptual
arrangement of the elements in his or her knowledge base, such that someone with a
broad knowledge base with many interconnections among concepts would be better able
to generate creative solutions than someone with either a more impoverished knowledge
base or one with fewer interconnections. The Remote Associates Test (Mednick, 1962)
measures the capacity for associating three apparently unrelated or remotely-related
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words with the provision of a fourth word that relates to each of the three. Participants
who are more creative at associating remote elements to converge on the correct answer
are expected to have a higher preference than less-creative participants for gestalt images.
Participants who are creative in their abilities to construct the most novel and
divergent, yet recognizable, patterns with common shapes are expected to prefer images
with skewed or altered gestalt characteristics, non-gestalt images, to a greater degree than
their less creative peers. It is possible that these creative people will more readily
perceive gestalt images, which themselves are more readily perceived, and will be more
likely to prefer modifications to these images to increase the novelty of their patterns.
The novelty of an image may be reflected in its complexity, and creative people are
expected to prefer complex images requiring increased attention over simple, morefamiliar patterns to a degree greater than that of their less-creative peers.
Creative people have generally preferred complex images to simple figures on
the Barron-Welsch Art Scale (Welsch & Barron, 1963), a relationship that reflects the
association between creativity and tolerance for ambiguity (Barron, 1963), and lends
credence to the expectation that people who demonstrate the ability to create novel
patterns from common elements will have higher preferences for non-gestalt images.
Novel pattern creations are expected also to relate to figure preference scores on the
Barron-Welsch Art Scale. Participants' preferences for complex, asymmetrical images on
the Art Scale are expected to relate positively to their preferences for non-gestalt images
and negatively to preferences for gestalt images.
Different personality type preferences are expected to relate to different degrees
of preference for gestalt and non-gestalt images. Personality-type preferences for the
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subjective poles of the four Myers-Briggs dichotomous scales are expected to relate to
stronger preferences for non-gestalt images.
Images preferences are expected to differ among participants with different
combinations of skepticism and belief. People categorized as high in skepticism are
expected to have higher preferences for gestalt images than those low in skepticism.
People categorized as high in belief are expected to have stronger preferences for non
gestalt images than are people low in belief. People categorized as high in both
skepticism and belief are expected to have the highest overall image preferences.
Creativity is expected to relate to personality type preferences, with the subjective
poles of introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving relating to higher scores on the
Barron-Welsch Art Scale, indicating stronger preferences for complex images.
Creativity is expected to differ among participants with different levels of
skepticism and belief. Participants measuring high in skepticism are expected to have
higher scores than those low in skepticism on the RAT. Art Scale scores are expected to
differ among participants high and low in skepticism and belief.
The preceding hypotheses, enumerated, are:
1. All participants are expected to prefer gestalt images to non-gestalt images.
2. Drawing task scores are expected to relate positively to figure preference
scores on the Barron-Welsch Art Scale.
3. Participants with higher RAT scores are expected to have a higher preference
than less-creative participants for gestalt images.

4. Participants who score higher on the drawing task are expected to prefer
images with skewed or altered gestalt characteristics, non-gestalt images, to a
greater degree than their less creative peers.
5. Participants' preferences for complex, asymmetrical images on the Art Scale
are expected to relate positively to their preferences for non-gestalt images
and negatively to preferences for gestalt images.
6. Different personality type preferences are expected to relate to different
degrees of preference for gestalt and non-gestalt images. Personality-type
preferences for the subjective poles of the four Myers-Briggs dichotomous
scales are expected to relate to stronger preferences for non-gestalt images.
7. Images preferences are expected to differ among participants with different
combinations of skepticism and belief. People categorized as high in
skepticism are expected to have higher preferences for gestalt images than
those low in skepticism. People categorized as high in belief are expected to
have stronger preferences for non-gestalt images than are people low in belief.
People categorized as high in both skepticism and belief are expected to have
the highest overall image preferences.
8. Creativity is expected to relate to personality type preferences, with the
subjective poles of introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving relating to
higher scores on the Barron-Welsch Art Scale, indicating stronger preferences
for complex images.
9. Creativity is expected to differ among participants with different levels of
skepticism and belief. Participants measuring high in skepticism are expected
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to have higher scores than those low in skepticism on the RAT. Art Scale
scores are expected to differ among participants high and low in skepticism
and belief.
Method
Participants
Seventy-four students, 34 male and 40 female, enrolled in introductory
psychology classes during the spring of 2000 participated in this study. Each student
received one hour of course credit for his or her participation.
Instruments
Images: Sixty visual images and symbols in a simple, clip-art form were used in
this study (Appendix A).

The images were comprised of relatively common figures,

objects, and shapes. Twenty of these images were created having high "form quality," a
term operationalized to indicate perceptual properties including symmetry, proximity,
similarity, continuation, and closure. These images were called "gestalt" images, and
each displayed on or more qualities of form.
The other forty images were objects and shapes similar to the gestalt images, but
had altered or skewed form qualities. Examples include a face with blatantly
asymmetrical features, a circle that doesn't close, and groups of geometric shapes
scattered in such a way as to prevent similar shapes and sizes of shapes from appearing
proximal to each other in the display space. This group of images was termed “non
gestalt” in reference to the images’ deviations from gestalt form.
Creativity: The Remote Associates Test (RAT): The RAT (Appendix B) is an
assessment of creativity on which participants must associate words into new
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combinations by providing a fourth word that is associated with each of three given
words. Items include "mower, atomic, foreign," and "out, dog, cat," to which correct
responses would be, respectively, "power" and "house" (Mednick, 1962). A 10-item
version of the RAT was administered to participants to assess their abilities to combine
remote elements into new associations that converge on a correct answer to each item.
Creativity: Drawing Task: Four groupings of two-dimensional geometric shapes
and alphabet letters (Appendix C) developed for an experiment on creative mental
synthesis (Finke & Slayton, 1988) were given in groups of three to participants, who
were asked to create novel constructions or patterns with all three objects in each group.
Participants were told they could alter the size and orientation of the presented shapes,
but they could not alter the form or structure of any shape. In addition, participants were
asked to name or label each drawing. They had one minute to complete each drawing.
Each of the four drawings was rated on recognizability and novelty. Scores were given
as percentages based on the total numbers of a specific response. A total score for each
participant was obtained by summing the scores of the four drawings. Drawings that
were unrecognizable or unlabeled, or that did not adhere to the instructions for form and
content, were given a score of zero. This scoring system reflects the general aims of the
Finke and Slayton (1988) study from which these shapes were drawn, but was modified
to better-suit the purposes and smaller sample sizes of this study. This drawing task was
given to participants to assess their ability to creatively synthesize images or parts of
images into original forms.
Image Complexity: The Barron-Welsch Art Scale: The Barron-Welsch Art Scale
(Appendix D) is an 86-item inventory of drawings that are classified as either complex
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and asymmetrical or simple and symmetrical (Welsch & Barron, 1963). Forty of the
items were used in this study. Participants indicate their preferences by responding that
they "like" or "dislike" each image. Participants are given one point for each complex
image that they like and simple image that they dislike. Scale scores are the sum of the
participants' total points.
Skepticism: The Scientific Attitude Inventory II (SAI-ID: The scientific attitude is
not directly analogous to skepticism, but overlaps conceptually with skepticism as an
empirically-minded, objective evaluation of information. For this reason, and because of
the lack of instruments directly measuring skepticism independently of paranormal and/or
religious belief, the SA III was used to assess participants’ levels of skepticism. The
SAI-H (Appendix E) is a revision of the Scientific Attitude Inventory and uses a five-item
Likert response scale on 40 items to measure attitude and position toward science and the
scientific enterprise. Items include statements such as "Scientists are always interested in
better explanations of things," "The senses are one of the most important tools a scientist
has," and "I would like to work with other scientists to solve scientific problems."
Responses to each item can range from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).
Information concerning reliability and validity is provided in the published scale (Moore
& Foy, 1997).
Belief: The Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS): The Paranormal Belief Scale
(Appendix F) is a 25-item self-report questionnaire that uses a five-item Likert response
scale to assess paranormal belief on seven dimensions represented as paranormal
subscales. Items include statements such as "The soul continues to exist though the body
may die," "Dreams can provide information about the future," and "The Loch Ness
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monster of Scotland exists." Responses to each item can range from strongly disagree (1)
to strongly agree (5). Reliability and validity information is provided in the published
scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).
Personality Type: The Mvers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI): The MBTI
(Appendix G) is a 93-item inventory measuring personality-type preferences along four
dichotomous categories (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998). These
preferences comprise a dynamic personality type that is greater than the sum of its
combined parts. The four dichotomous categories are opposite domains of mental
functioning, and include opposite ways of perceiving (sensation and intuition), opposite
ways of judging (thinking and feeling), opposite attitudes in which preferred judgement
and preferred perception are typically used (extraversion and introversion), and opposite
ways of relating to the world (judging and perceiving). Each of the scale's 93 questions
has a dichotomous response option from one preference category. Each response is
counted toward one pole of a category. Responses were summed for each question,
yielding scores for each pole of each category scale, a total of eight scale scores per
participant.
Program
Images were presented on a computer projection system using Inquisit, an
experimental laboratory software program developed to design and run experiments and
to collect data.
Procedure
Participants were given instructions (Appendix H) and the consent form
(Appendix I). Series of images were presented to participants at two successive times, T1
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and T2. There were three different orderings of image presentation, categorized as image
groups 1-3. Group 1 images were presented subliminally at T1 and supraliminally at T2.
Group 2 images were presented supraliminally at T1 and supraliminally at T2. Group 3
images were not presented at T1 and were presented supraliminally at T2. Images
presented subliminally were preceded and followed by a TIME/FRAME gray blanking
screen used as a mask to decrease exposure time and prevent afterimage effects. Degrees
of image presentation differed at T1 to enable comparison of participants' preferences for
image types to which they had been exposed previously. For one-half of the participants,
approximately half of the images in each group were high in form quality and half were
low in form quality. For the other half, all images were low in form quality. Images
were randomly grouped and ordered in presentation. As they viewed each image
presented at T2, participants were asked whether or not they liked the image (preference
ratings on a 1-7 scale).
After the second series of image presentations, participants completed the Remote
Associates Test and constructed four patterns using three shapes per pattern from each of
four sets, used previously in studies conducted by Finke and Slayton (1988). Participants
then completed the Barron-Welsch Art Scale, the Scientific Attitude Inventory n, the
Paranormal Belief Scale, and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Following completion of
the experiment, a debriefing statement (Appendix J) explaining the purpose and rationale
of the study was made available to participants.
Image Preference Ratings
Participants rated either a combination of gestalt and non-gestalt images or non
gestalt images only. Twenty-two participants had usable data for gestalt image ratings
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and 44 participants had usable data for non-gestalt image ratings. For those analyses
comparing gestalt images to non-gestalt images, participants' scores were included only if
they rated both gestalt and non-gestalt images.
Of the 74 participants in the study, 58 had complete and usable data on the
Remote Associates Test. The test is scored by giving one point for each correct response,
yielding a range of possible scores from 0-10. Participant scores ranged from 0-9.
Sixty-two participants had complete data on the modified Finke and Slayton
(1988) drawing task. Scores were determined as percentages based on the total numbers
of a specific response. For example, if the same drawing were constructed by 16 people,
each participant that constructed it was given a score of 1/16 for that drawing. If a
drawing was unrecognizable or unlabeled, or deviated from the directions given for form
and content, it was given a score of zero. Total scores were summed across four
drawings, and ranged from .13-3.5.
Art Scale Scores
Fifty-nine participants had complete data for the Barron-Welsch Art Scale. The
range of possible scores is 0-29. The participant score range was 1-23.
Personality-Type Preferences
Forty-seven participants had complete data on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.
The four dichotomous scales of the Type Indicator have individual ranges of preference
scores, each with a minimum of zero. The dichotomous choices on each scale sum to that
scale's maximum score. The maximum score between extraversion and introversion is
21, between sensing and intuition is 26, between thinking and feeling is 24, and between
judgement and perceiving is 22. For example, someone with an extraversion score of 8
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would have a corresponding introversion score of 13, and someone with a sensing score
of 0 would have an intuition score of 26. Participant scores spanned the entire range of
each scale. Analyses of participants' scores on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator were
performed with each of the eight resulting scale scores.
Categorical Groupings by Scores on the Scientific Attitude Inventory and the Paranormal
Belief Scale
Scale scores on the Scientific Attitude Inventory (SAI) and Paranormal Belief
Scale (PBS) were dichotomized into high and low categories and then used to create a
2x2 grouping variable to place participants in categories reflecting different levels and
combinations of skepticism and belief.
Fifty-eight participants had complete data on the Scientific Attitude Inventory II.
The range of possible scores is 40-200, and participants' scores ranged from 115-179. A
median split at 141 was used to place participants into groups of low-and high
skepticism. Thirty participants were placed in the low-skepticism category, and 28
participants were placed in the high-skepticism category.
Fifty-eight participants had complete data on the Paranormal Belief Scale. The
range of possible scores is 25-125, and participants' scores ranged from 30-92. A median
split at 68 placed 30 participants into the low-belief grouping and 28 participants into the
high-belief grouping.
A 2x2 grouping variable was computed between the skepticism groupings and the
belief groupings. Participants were categorized as low in skepticism and low in belief
(n=14), high in skepticism and low in belief (n=16), low in skepticism and high in belief
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(n=16), and high in skepticism and high in belief (n=12). The resulting groups were
given the names "neither," "skeptic," "believer," or "both," for clarity of reference.
Results
Preferences for Gestalt Images and Non-gestalt Images
Ratings for gestalt images were expected to be higher than for non-gestalt images.
Preference ratings were computed for all images shown to participants in the combined
gestalt and non-gestalt group. Each of the participants rated his or her preferences for 15
gestalt images and 15 non-gestalt images. The preference means were 4.24 for gestalt
images and 3.29 for non-gestalt images. A paired-samples comparison determined that
ratings of images differed by image type (t (21) = 5.905, p < .001), with higher ratings for
gestalt images, as predicted. Preferences for gestalt and non-gestalt images were related
(r (22) = .628, p < .005).
Preliminary paired-sample comparisons of gestalt and non-gestalt images at
different levels of previous exposure confirmed the effects of previous supraliminal
exposure on image ratings for non-gestalt images. Preference ratings for gestaltsubliminal and gestalt-new images were significantly higher than those for non-gestaltsubliminal and non-gestalt-new images (t (21) = 4.353, p < .001; t (21) = 5.955, p <
.001), but preferences for gestalt-supraliminal images did not differ significantly from
those for non-gestalt-supraliminal images (t (21) = 1.471, p > .05). Preferences for
gestalt images did not differ between gestalt-subliminal and gestalt-supraliminal, gestaltsubliminal and gestalt-new, or non-gestalt-subliminal and non-gestalt new (t (21) = .254,

P > .05; t (21) = -.213, p > .05; t (21) = .122, p > .05), but were different between non
gestalt-subliminal and non-gestalt-supraliminal (t (21) = 2.518, p < .05). Descriptive
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statistics for gestalt and non-gestalt images at the three levels of previous exposure are
presented in Table 1.
Creativity Measures
Drawing task scores were expected to relate positively to Art Scale scores, but the
relationship was not significant (r (43) = -.194, p > .05), and means were opposite the
predicted direction. Correlations between both the RAT and the drawing task and the
RAT and the Art Scale were not significant (r (55) = -.208, p > .05; r (39) = -.116, p >
.05). Therefore, image preferences and personality measures were analyzed with regard
to independent creativity measures rather than a combined creativity variable.
Image Preference and Creativity
Image preference was expected to co-vary with participants’ types and levels of
creativity. Preference for gestalt images was expected to relate positively to scores on the
RAT. The relationship was marginally significant (r (13) = .462, p = .056).
Preference for non-gestalt images was expected to relate positively to scores on
the drawing task. Preferences for non-gestalt images did not relate to drawing task scores
(r (32) = .047, p > .05).
Art Scale scores were expected to relate positively to preferences for non-gestalt
images and negatively to preferences for gestalt images. The inverse correlation between
Art Scale scores and gestalt images was significant (r (9) = -.741, p < .05), but the
correlation between Art Scale score and preference for non-gestalt images was not (r (21)
= .160, p > .05).
Image Preference and Personality Type
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Personality-type components were expected to relate to degrees of preference for
gestalt and non-gestalt images. Preferences for the subjective (I, N, F, P) poles of the
four Myers-Briggs dichotomous scales were expected to correlate positively with
preferences for non-gestalt images. Preference for extraversion was marginally related to
preference for gestalt images (r (6) = .796, p = .058). No other significant relationships
were found among personality types and image preferences.
Image Preference and Skepticism and Belief
Participants with different levels of skepticism and belief were expected to differ
in their preferences for gestalt and non-gestalt images. People categorized as high in
skepticism were expected to have higher preferences for gestalt images than those low in
skepticism, and they did (F (I, 6) = 11.132, p < .05). Participants high in belief were
expected to have higher preferences for non-gestalt images than were those low in belief,
but the difference was not significant (F (1, 18) = .775, p > .05). Descriptive statistics on
gestalt and non-gestalt image preferences and levels of skepticism and belief are
presented in Table 2.
People categorized as high in both skepticism and belief were expected to have
the highest overall image preferences. Differences in total image preferences among
skepticism/belief groupings were marginally significant (F (3, 4) = 6.292, p = .054), and
linear contrasts determined that the overall mean preference ratings of the "both” group
were significantly higher than those of the "neither,” "skeptic," and "believer” groups
combined (t (4) = 3.566, p < .05). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for image
preferences by categorization on the combined skepticism and belief grouping variable.
Creativity and Personality
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Preferences for the subjective I, N, F, and P poles of the MBTI were expected to
correlate positively with Art Scale scores. Preferences for introversion, intuition, feeling,
and perceiving are positively related to Art-Scale scores, and preferences for the opposite,
objective poles are negatively related to scores on the Art Scale. The relationship
between intuition and Art Scale scores was the weakest correlation (r (47) = .2, p = .088),
and the opposite sensing preference had a stronger relationship to the Art Scale (r (47) = .405, p = < .005). All correlations are therefore of least marginal significance, and are
presented in Table 4.
Creativity and Skepticism and Belief
Participants measuring high in skepticism were expected to have higher scores on
the RAT than those low in skepticism. Mean differences between the two groups were
not significant (F (1, 37) = .499, p > .05).
Scores on the Art Scale were expected to differ among participants with different
levels of skepticism and belief. The interaction between skepticism and belief was
significant for Art Scale scores (F (1, 54) = 4.64, p < .05), suggesting that interacting
levels of these orientations, rather than isolated levels of one or the other, are associated
with higher scores on the Art Scale. The interaction is displayed in Figure 1.
Discussion
The primary purposes of this study were to provide a rationale for possible
methods and reasons for the persistence of certain kinds of image and symbol forms, to
consider the modifications and alterations made to images in their various appearances,
and to examine the individual qualities that might predispose some people to prefer
certain images and use them creatively in their work. Attributes of the images and of the
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participants to whom they were presented were expected to clarify potential factors that
might facilitate preference for and creative transmission of image forms. Study of the
confluence of image properties, creative abilities and processes, and personality attributes
can be strengthened by consideration of the relationships discovered and practical
concerns encountered in this study. Future work in this area might present the overall
profile of creative individuals that did not emerge from separate findings on image
preference, personality, and skepticism and belief orientations in this study.
Image Preference Findings
Participants preferred gestalt images to non-gestalt images, supporting the
contention that people are inclined to prefer form-congruent, meaningful patterns to
images with disordered or reordered elements. Preferences for the two types of images
correlated positively, supporting the evaluation of gestalt and non-gestalt images
independently of one another and as combined total image preference scores with regard
to creativity, personality, and skepticism and belief orientations.
Preliminary exploration of the effects of image exposure on preferences for
gestalt and non-gestalt images indicates that previous exposure to visual images increases
preference for atypical, incongruent forms more than for expected, orderly forms.
Preferences for gestalt and non-gestalt images were equivalent for images to which
participants previously had been exposed supraliminally, and preferences for non-gestalt
images were higher for previously supraliminal images than for previously subliminal
images, but did not differ between previously subliminal images and new images.
Awareness of previous image presentation therefore seems to be a predisposing variable
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in increasing preferences for non-gestalt images. Preferences for gestalt images did not
differ with respect to type of prior image presentation.
Convergent creativity, as measured by the RAT, was marginally related to
preferences for gestalt images, providing some evidence that people who are adept at
tasks requiring both originality of associations and intelligence to converge on a useful
outcome prefer images that express order and simplicity to a degree greater than that of
their less-creative peers. Although Art Scale scores were negatively related to gestalt
image preference, no associations were found among preferences for non-gestalt images,
scores on the drawing task, and scores on the Art Scale. The latter finding detracts from
the speculation that an underlying subjective preference and use of visual images can be
demonstrated through these measures.
The contribution of subjective personality orientations is mildly supported by
relationships of personality types to image preferences. Jung (1971) described his
proposed personality types as dynamic combinations of dichotomous preferences along
three continuous scales, each having an objective and subjective pole. Jung suggested
that introversion, intuition, and feeling reflect the subjective orientation. Myers’ and
Briggs’ development of the judging-perceiving dichotomy adds perceiving as the fourth
subjective personality preference (Myers, et al, 1998). Preferences for introversion,
intuition, feeling, and perceiving were not found to be related to preferences for non
gestalt images, as predicted based on the aspects of subjectivity suggested for these
variables. Preference for extraversion was related to preference for gestalt images, but
this finding lends only weak support to the hypothesized congruence of subjectivity.
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The image preferences of participants with varying skepticism and belief levels
are more congruent with a global conception of objective and subjective orientations.
Skepticism as measured by the SA III incorporates an attitude of enthusiasm for the
empirical processes of science, and therefore is presumed to share with sciencemindedness a preference for an orderly and congruent arrangement of data and concepts.
The finding that participants grouped as high in skepticism gave higher preference ratings
than those grouped low in skepticism to gestalt images reflects this predilection.
No differences were found between participants high and low in belief on preferences for
non-gestalt images, weakening the speculation that a high belief orientation might
predispose a person to prefer unusual and altered patterns. However, participants scoring
high on measures of both skepticism and belief had higher total image preferences,
combined from gestalt and non-gestalt preference means, than the skeptics, believers, and
“neithers” combined, supporting the role of belief as a contributor to preferences for
novel images and altered form patterns, and to the combination of objective and
subjective expressions in visual image appreciation.
Creativity Findings
The RAT, drawing task, and Art Scale scores did not correlate with one another,
making necessary the use of independent creativity measures for comparisons among
personality type preferences and skepticism and belief orientations. MBTI preferences
for introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving were related to higher levels of
creativity as measured by preferences for the complex image forms on the Bairon-Welsch
Art Scale, and the opposite, objective orientations (extraversion, sensing, thinking, and
judging) were negatively related to complex Art Scale image preference. Relationships
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between personality type preferences and Art Scale scores support the idea that subjective
personality orientations are related to preferences for novelty and complexity, and that
objective orientations may be similarly related to preferences for more concrete,
symmetrical forms.
Participants measuring high and low in skepticism did not differ in RAT scores,
despite expectations that objectivity and critical thinking ability would be demonstrably
involved in both measures. The interaction of skepticism and belief corresponded to Art
Scale scores, implicating the confluence of both orientations as an important factor in
complex and novel image preference and potentially creative image use.
Practical Concerns and Limitations
Data collection: Availability and completeness of data were not uniform for all
participants. Too large a number of participants had incomplete overall data to dismiss
errors in data collection. A more complete data set would have increased predictive
power, possibly increasing the number of significant findings, particularly in those
analyses in which reported effect sizes were compromised by groups with very small
sample sizes.
Equipment difficulties: Equipment error caused problems with experimental
control that resulted in incomplete data for some participants. The rate of image
presentation was not constant for some groups of participants, and their image preference
ratings were discarded. Preference-rating data was not differentially discarded among
participants with complete or incomplete data on other measures; the resulting decrease
in predictive power is therefore of greater concern than is undue influence of image
presentation among participants.
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Experimental milieu: Considerations of time may have impacted the collection of
valid data on creative performance and the preferences associated with creativity,
especially on those measures, such as the RAT and the drawing task, that are timed. The
experiment was conducted and measures taken within a narrow time span; “real-world”
creativity is more fluid and possibly atemporal. People with different personality type
preferences have demonstrated different responses to time and its passage (Mann,
Siegler, & Osmond, 1968; Myers, et al, 1998). Indeed, the preferences often mostassociated with innovation—intuition and perceiving (Gryskiewicz & Tullar, 1995;
Myers, et al, 1998)—have been theorized and shown to be less aware of time
requirements and constraints (Myers, et al). The experimental setting might be most
restrictive for the expression of creativity among people with these preferences.
Creativity determined by discrete intervals may not accurately or adequately represent
creative potential in a temporally relaxed situation.
Participant sample: Creativity and image preferences were hypothesized to relate
to individual attributes that may not be linearly applicable along an entire spectrum of
creativity. Characteristics that are distinguished among the most creative people may not
be found in the same relative degrees in less-creative people; image and personality-type
preferences and levels of skepticism and belief might not increase incrementally with
increases in creativity. A sample that is either more inclusive of a broader range of
creativity or comprised predominantly of highly creative people would better-enable
comparisons along a range of creativity scores or distinctions within a limited, highly
creative sample of scores. Relationships and interactions among personality type
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preferences and skepticism and belief orientations with regard to image preference and
degrees of creativity could be clarified.
Measurement and validity concerns: The non-gestalt images, the drawing task,
and the Art Scale were included with the intention of demonstrating the congruence of
subjective preferences for visual images and the ability and motivation to create or
appreciate patterns constructed from common elements that are then altered in form to
increase novelty and complexity. The non-gestalt images, the drawing task, the Art
Scale, and the belief orientation are themselves more subjective than the gestalt images,
the RAT, and the skepticism orientation, and it is possible that the expected responses
and relationships among them were more nebulous and difficult to satisfactorily measure
because of their subjectivity. The necessary objectivity of the experimental setting also
might influence the precision with which subjective preferences can be measured.
A more straightforward explanation of the failure to associate non-gestalt image
preference with novelty of drawing constructions and complex figure preference is that
the measures, especially the drawing task and its scoring, did not validly measure the
desired construct in a way that would be meaningful when assessed with respect to other
measures.
The drawing task was based on the geometric shapes and letters used by Finke
and Slayton (1988), and though conceived to approximate the general aims of the original
study, it nevertheless was altered in execution and overall scoring to accommodate the
specific design and purpose of this study. Therefore, the reliability and validity of the
measure are suspect. The task was designed to measure participants' abilities to integrate
a common group of simple shapes into a new figure that was both recognizable, or
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nameable, and original. The least-frequent responses received the highest scores. The
small number of patterns constructed therefore may have given these responses undue
influence on the total score distribution, a problem that would not be found with the
larger number of pattern constructions (112) in the Finke and Slayton study.
In addition, the drawings produced by participants were rated on their novelty
without regard to their complexity, a potential confound when comparing the task to
measures addressing complexity, such as the Art Scale. A similar criticism can be
brought against the non-gestalt images. Although these images are novel alterations and
modifications of gestalt forms, their asymmetries do not approximate the complexity of
the Art Scale pictures.
Despite problems with the subjective components of the proposed model of
overall creativity, measuring polar constructs such as gestalt and non-gestalt image
preferences, skepticism and belief, and convergent and novel aspects of creativity
independently of one another enabled findings of significant interactions between the
more-objective and the more-subjective components. These results support the idea that
oppositional preferences, when combined, might be part of a constellation of variables
that lends itself to high overall creativity.
Implications of results
Studies of creativity are predominantly focused on the creative product, process,
or person (Mayer, 1999), although emphases also include such factors as the temporal
and situational context or interacting system in which creativity occurs
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Gardner, 1993; Simonton, 1984). Creative products are
considered for their novelty and contextual usefulness (Amabile & Tighe, 1993; Feist,
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1993; Gruber & Wallace, 1999; Koestler, 1964) and creative processes for the association
and integration of elements previously deemed incongruent (Koestler, 1964; Mednick,
1962). Creative people are assessed on their capacities for reliably making the
associations necessary for generating novel products from previous knowledge and
invention (Gardner, 1989; Wertheimer, 1982), as well as for the personality attributes
frequently found among individuals with these abilities (Eysenck, 1993; Feist, 1993;
McCrae, 1987). In their affiliation of familiar and original elements and association of
remote properties, creative products and processes incorporate complimentary opposites.
The creative individual should also be likely to reflect these emphases on a dialectical
combination of complimentary elements in his or her preferences and personality to a
greater degree than a less-creative person.
The form of creative process or behavior in which the person engages and the
domain in which he or she works impact the expression and development of these
tendencies, such that different aspects of creativity might be maximally expressed in
certain areas regardless of the person’s overall creative potential. Personality differences
between creative scientists and creative artists have been cited (see Feist, 1999 for
review), including a preference for order (scientists) and higher nonconformity (artists).
The speculations and findings of this study might reflect similar patterns of influence and
expression.
Preference for order and congruence among science-minded people, reflected in
the discovered relationship between gestalt image preference and skepticism, can be
related to the capacity to associate divergent constructs into the simplest possible
expression of information. High performance on the RAT demonstrates the ability to
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converge on a discrete, correct response, thereby conceptually overlapping with the
skeptical attitude prevalent in scientific domains.
The Art Scale emphasizes complex image representations and uncommon patterns
requiring increased concentration, and the drawing task was conceived to evaluate unique
and diverse image combinations, affiliating both measures with the more novel and
subjective approach to creativity and image preference. Paranormal belief is inherently
characterized by a penchant for the unusual and unfamiliar, and fits nicely in the realm of
subjective preferences.
Tendencies toward nonconformity among artistically creative people could
underlie preferences for subjective modifications of visual expression, reflected in a
preference for non-gestalt images. Novel recombinations of form might increase the
complexity with which the image is viewed and the attentional demands placed on the
viewer. A diversion from congruent form lacks the immediate recognition of simpler,
less challenging designs. Violations of form qualities therefore conflict with visual
expectations (Zeki, 1999), resulting in images that sustain visual focus in an effort to
resolve the conflicted perception (Zeki). Unexpected rearrangements of form may have
differential appeal to people depending on their immersion in visual imagery and their
subsequent quest for novelty, and individuals working creatively with images in artistic
domains may forego orderly pattern arrangement as a means of representing information
in favor of creating abstractions that are themselves the desired outcome.
To hold appeal as a creative product, however, such “disordered” images must
appeal to someone other than the creator, and recognition by the field (Csikszentmihalyi,
1988) indicates commonalities of preference. Eliminating either the most common
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elements or the remnant details to exaggerate the most essential or salient features of an
image can enhance the image’s appeal by producing a similarly- heightened response
(Coss 1968; Ramachandran, 1998; Zeki, 1999). The mechanisms by which images are
perceived as striking or startling are therefore common with those involved in the
perception of simple, congruent forms, suggesting that the preference for unique or
complex images might be developed at least in part by domain dependence.
I conceptualized objective and subjective orientations as two types of preference
and thinking that would best lend themselves to an optimal manifestation of creativity
when combined. However, a person’s affiliation with a domain might have a greater
impact on creativity than can be expressed by a simple combination of opposite trends.
These affiliations, or the individual’s choice of an area of creative pursuit, might
influence or reflect differential tendencies and preferences best suited to that domain.
Someone working in the sciences therefore might be maximally creative in his or her
domain, and may demonstrate some of the same characteristics, abilities, and tendencies
as someone working creatively in the arts, but would differ in the proportion of each
developed quality.
Despite domain-necessitated differences, creative people in the arts and sciences
do share personality qualities, as do the processes by which they work (Feist, 1991),
making plausible an evaluation of overall creativity combined from aspects associated
with both domains. Attendant with the evaluation of creativity and the attributes and
preferences associated with it is the importance of visual imagery in the arts and sciences.
Although the processes and purposes for transformation and transmission are somewhat
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different between artistic and scientific work, both illustrate aspects of pattern persistence
and repetition.
Jungian personality type preferences describe processes of information acquisition
and evaluation that are applicable across domains. The combination of scale preferences
produces a personality type with dynamics that are not merely the sum of the contributing
parts. The finding that preferences for introversion, intuition, feeling, and perceiving are
related to creativity does not imply that an INFP type is naturally more creative than
other types. Rather, the contributions made by these individual preferences, reinforced
through the continued exercise of the preferences, lend themselves to the development of
creativity, or reflect a personality predisposed to creativity that is expressed within the
construct of the whole type.
Different type preferences have been associated with different forms of creativity,
such as the association of intuition and perceiving with an innovating style of creativity
and sensing and judging with an adapting style of creativity (Gryskiewicz & Tullar,
1995). The domains in which people of a specific type most frequently work would
probably favor someone with creative abilities highly suited to the nature of the work in
that domain over someone whose creative capacities are more integrative and global but
less directly applicable.
Preliminary data suggest that the innovating style of creativity associated with
intuition is more prevalent in people high in skepticism (Stemme & Feist, 1999). Clark
(1955) proposed that religious beliefs and attitudes supplied motivation for creativity and
achievement while skepticism directed attention toward new forms of discovery. His
findings, however, did not support his contention, possibly because among his sample,

41

skepticism and belief were measured as opposites along one dimension. Intellectual
curiosity, the desire for new experiences, and the desire to gain knowledge and
understanding were associated with skepticism (Clark, 1955), and these qualities, though
not directly measured in this study, could be guardedly implicated in relationships among
skepticism and belief, image preference, and creativity.
Preferences for readily-recognizable and familiar gestalt images and the
predilection to create and use these images to convey or explain information would
reflect the desire to gain knowledge and understanding and to convey knowledge in the
simplest and most congruent representation possible. Finding a significant relationship
between skepticism and gestalt image preference supports this association. Intellectual
curiosity and the desire for new experiences might motivate people using visual images
in their work to modify these images to increase their novelty, complexity, and
attentional demands. Although no associations were found among belief orientation,
creativity, and image preference, the combination of skepticism and belief on Art Scale
scores and total image preferences provides evidence for Clark’s (1955) emphasis on
complimentary processes in creativity.
The correspondence between the high skepticism/high belief orientation and
preferences for complex images on the Barron-Welsch Art Scale was expected, but the
finding that participants low in both skepticism and belief had similarly-high Art Scale
scores was not anticipated. The lower scores of unipolar “skeptics” and “believers” could
be attributable to a lack of the balance provided by the opposite orientation, impeding
complexity with a deficit of either knowledge acquisition capacity and desire or curiosity
toward and preference for novelty. The relatively dramatic difference in the scores of
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skeptics might reflect a pure preference for order, and for simple and easily evaluated
images. These findings and conjectures lend credence to the consideration of interactions
between objective and subjective components in proceeding studies of creativity and
imagery.
Further Research
Investigation of the effects of subliminal and supraliminal image presentation
could clarify the influence of presentation rates on subsequent image preferences and
determine potential differential effects on gestalt and non-gestalt image preferences
among creative individuals. Creative people are thought to be especially open to
subjective perceptions and impressions (Martindale, Anderson, Moore, & West, 1996;
Smith & Van der Meer, 1994), even demonstrating evaluative abilities toward subliminal
stimuli (Smith & Van der Meer). Tendencies toward generally higher cortical activation
and arousal during a “resting” phase among creative people (see Martindale, 1990)
compliment subliminal impression findings. Perception of personally-salient images has
produced selectively heightened galvanic skin response in people for whom the images
are of consequence (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998; Ramachandran, Hirstein, Armel,
Tecoma, & Iragui, 1997), and may relate to image preference in a similar manner.
Measures of physiological sensitivity in more- and less-creative people to gestalt and
non-gestalt type images might support the speculation that gestalt images are more
readily perceived and familiar among creative individuals, and further studies on image
preference following various durations of image exposures could determine increased
tolerances and preferences for images based on the number and type of previous
exposures and the creative abilities of the participants.
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Supporting Jung’s (1971) view on the biological basis of personality and type
preference, physiological research affiliating introversion with heightened cortical
arousal (Eysenck, 1990; Wilson & Languis, 1989) provides further validation for the
development of a physiological and neurological paradigm for image preference,
creativity, and personality type. The inclusion of skepticism and belief orientations in
this model is warranted by evidence of differential cortical activation of the right and left
hemispheres in people engaged in behaviors and experiences related to attitudes of
skepticism and belief (Jaynes, 1976; Persinger,1993).
Developing a physiological paradigm for the intersection of image preference and
personality with creativity should by a supplementary effort to illustrate how these
variables might relate to one another and be expressed in the creative person.
Determining whether creativity is a whole that emerges from an interaction among
constellations of involved variables, or a part of what constitutes the associated variables
could not be reliably achieved.
Causal imprecision does not necessitate that future studies remain descriptive and
predictive. A detailed study of the effects of image exposure on the actual use of the
presented images might provide evidence for both the persistence of image preference
and creative image use, as well as comparison of the ways in which images are produced,
reproduced, and modified by people differing in personality and knowledge orientation
and domain affiliation. A more defined investigation would be an appropriate step
toward illuminating the ways in which each of these variables contributes to the
continued creative use of visual images. A broader investigation, including a diversified
sample with a greater range of creativity, a stronger focus on multiple aspects of
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skepticism and belief and personality-type preferences with regard to domain
involvement, and direct work with a larger number and variety of visual images, might
demonstrate additional interactions between objective and subjective factors influencing
and characterizing the role of creativity in the re-creation of visual forms.
Visual image preference might be a singular quality, or it might reflect global
tendencies in pattern perception and appreciation. Including auditory forms, such as
language and musical patterns, and conceptual themes in literature and narrative
description in studies of pattern persistence could make possible comparison of persisting
forms among different sensory modalities. Individual differences in ability and
predilection to perceive and use or create visual, auditory, or narrative motifs also could
be determined.
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Appendix A
Gestalt and Non-gestalt Images
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Appendix B
Remote Associates Test
Anwers

Items
1. guy

owl

man

wise

2. soul

busy

guard

body

3. mower

atomic

foreign

power

4. widow

board

cat

black

5. arrow

laced

narrow

straight

6. club

gown

mare

night

7. railroad

girl

class

working

8. surprise

line

birthday

party

9. wheel

electric

high

chair

10. out

dog

cat

house
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Appendix C
Shapes for Drawing Task
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Appendix D
Barron-Welsch Art Scale

36

40

66

Appendix E
Scientific Attitude Inventory II
1. I would enjoy studying science.
2. Anything we need to know can be found out through science.
3. It is useless to listen to a new idea unless everybody agrees with it.
4. Scientists are always interested in better explanations of things.
5. If one scientist says an idea is true, all other scientists will believe it.
6. Only highly trained scientists can understand science.
7. We can always get answers to our questions by asking a scientist.
8. Most people are not able to understand science.
9. Electronics are examples of the really valuable products of science.
10. Scientists cannot always find the answers to their questions.
11. When scientists have a good explanation, they do not try to make it better.
12. Most people can understand science.
13. The search for scientific knowledge would be boring.
14. Scientific work would be too hard for me.
15. Scientists discover laws that tell us exactly what is going on in nature.
16. Scientific ideas can be changed.
17. Scientific questions are answered by observing things.
18. Good scientists are willing to change their ideas.
19. Some questions cannot be answered by science.
20. A scientist must have a good imagination to create new ideas.
21. Ideas are the important result of science.
2 2 .1 do not want to be a scientist.
23. People must understand science because it affects their lives.
24. A major purpose of science is to produce new drugs and save lives.
25. Scientists must report exactly what they observe.
26. If a scientist cannot answer a question, another scientist can.
2 7 .1 would like to work with other scientists to solve scientific problems.
28. Science tries to explain how things happen.
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29. Every citizen should understand science.
3 0 .1 may not make great discoveries, but working in science would be fun.
31. A major purpose of science is to help people live better.
32. Scientists should not criticize each other's work.
33. The senses are one of the most important tools a scientist has.
34. Scientists believe that nothing is known to be true for sure.
35. Scientific laws have proven beyond all reasonable doubt.
3 6 .1 would like to be a scientist.
37. Scientists do not have enough time for their families or for fun.
38. Scientific work is useful only to scientists.
39. Scientists have to study too much.
40. Working in a science laboratory would be fun.
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Appendix F
Paranormal Belief Scale
1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
2. Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
3. Black magic really exists.
4. Black cats can bring bad luck.
5. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
6. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists.
7. Dreams can provide information about the future.
8. There is a devil.
9. Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does occur.
10. Witches do exist.
11. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck.
12. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
13. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists.
14. Some people have the ability to predict the future.
15.1 believe in God.
16. A person's thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object.
17. Voodoo is a real method to use paranormal powers.
18. The number "13" is unlucky.
19. Reincarnation does occur.
20. Big Foot exists.
21. The idea of predicting the future is foolish.
22. There is a heaven and hell.
23. Ktfind reading is not possible.
24. There are actual cases of voodoo death.
25. It is possible to communicate with the dead.
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Appendix G
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
Which answer comes closest to describing how you usually feel or act?
1. When you go somewhere for the day, would you rather
(A) plan what you will do and when, or
(B) just go?
2. If you were a teacher, would you rather teach
(A) fact courses, or
(B) courses involving theory?
3. Are you usually
(A) a "good mixer," or
(B) rather quiet and reserved?
4. Do you prefer to
(A) arrange dates, parties, etc., well in advance, or
(B) be free to do whatever looks like fun when the time comes?
5. Do you usually get along better with
(A) imaginative people, or
(B) realistic people?
6. Do you more often let
(A) your heart rule your head, or
(B) your head rule your heart?
7. When you are with a group of people, would you usually rather
(A) join in the talk of the group, or
(B) talk individually with people you know well?
8. Do you prefer to do many things
(A) on the spur of the moment, or
(B) according to your plans?
9. Would you rather be considered
(A) a practical person, or
(B) an ingenious person?
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10. In a large group, do you more often
(A) introduce others, or
(B) get introduced?
11. Are you more attracted to
(A) a person with a quick and brilliant mind, or
(B) a practical person with a lot of common sense?
12. Does following a schedule
(A) appeal to you, or
(B) cramp you?
13. Would you say it generally takes others
(A) a lot of time to get to know you, or
(B) a little time to get to know you?
14. Does the idea of making a list of what you should get done over a weekend
(A) appeal to you, or
(B) leave you cold?
15. Is it a higher compliment to be called
(A) a person of real feeling, or
(B) a consistently reasonable person?
16. Do you tend to spend a lot of time
(A) by yourself, or
(B) with others?
17. In your daily work, do you
(A) rather enjoy an emergency that makes you work against time, or
(B) usually plan your work so you won’t need to work under pressure?
18. Would you rather have as a friend someone who
(A) is always coming up with new ideas, or
(B) has both feet on the ground?
19. Can you
(A) talk easily to almost anyone for as long as you have to, or
(B) find a lot to say only to certain people or under certain conditions?
20. When you have a special job to do, do you like to
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(A) organize it carefully before you start, or
(B) find out what is necessary as you go along?
21. Are you inclined to
(A) value sentiment more that logic, or
(B) value logic more than sentiment?
22. In reading for pleasure, do you
(A) enjoy odd or original ways of saying things, or
(B) like writers to say exactly what they mean?
23. Can the new people you meet tell what you are interested in
(A) right away, or
(B) only after they really get to know you?
24. In planning a trip, would you prefer to
(A) most of the time do whatever you feel like that day, or
(B) know ahead of time what you'll be doing most days? .
25. In doing something that many other people do, does it appeal to you more to
(A) do it in the accepted way, or
(B) invent a way of your own?
26. Would most people say that you are
(A) a private person, or
(B) a very open person?

*

Which word in each pair appeals to you more? Think about what the words mean, not
how they look or how they sound.
27. (A) abstract
(B) solid
28. (A)scheduled
(B) unplanned
29. (A) gentle
(B) firm
30. (A) facts
(B)ideas
31. (A) thinking
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(B) feeling
32. (A) hearty
(B) quiet
33. (A) convincing
(B) touching
34. (A) statement
(B)concept
35. (A) analyze
(B) sympathize
36. (A) systematic
(B) spontaneous
37. (A) sensitive
(B)just
38. (A) reserved
(B) talkative
39. (A) no-nonsense
(B) theoretical
40. (A) compassion
(B) foresight
41. (A) systematic
(B) casual
42. (A) quiet
(B) outgoing
43. (A) benefits
(B) blessings
44. (A) theory
(B) certainty
45. (A) determined
(B) devoted
46. (A) idea
(B) actuality
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47. (A) strong-willed
(B) tenderhearted
48. (A) imaginative
(B) matter-of-fact
49. (A) objective
(B) passionate
50. (A) make
(B) create
51. (A) warm
(B) objective
52. (A) sensible
(B) fascinating
53. (A) compassionate
(B) logical
54. (A) production
(B) design
55. (A) impulse
(B) decision
56. (A) fair-minded
(B) caring
57. (A) quiet
(B) gregarious
58. (A) analytical
(B) sentimental
59. (A) unconstrained
(B) scheduled
60. (A) concrete
(B) abstract
61. (A) practical
(B) sentimental
62. (A)open
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(B) private
63. (A) build
(B) invent
64. (A) orderly
(B) easygoing
65. (A) imaginative
(B) realistic
66. (A) competent
(B) kindhearted
67. (A) theory
(B) fact
68. (A) few friends
(B) lots of friends
69. (A) possibilities
(B) certainties
70. (A)bighearted
(B) firm-minded
71. (A) novel
(B) already known
72. (A) tenderness
(B) strength
73. (A) practical
(B) innovative
Which answer comes closest to describing how you usually feel or act?
74. Do you find being around a lot of people
(A) gives you more energy, or
(B) is often "draining"?
75. When making a decision, is it more important to you to
(A) weigh the facts, or
(B) consider people’s feelings and opinions?
76. Do you generally prefer to

75

(A) make your social engagements some distance ahead, or
(B) be free to do things on the spur of the moment?
77. At parties, do you
(A) sometimes get bored, or
(B) always have fun?
78. In most instances, to you prefer to
(A) go with the flow, or
(B) follow a schedule?
79. Do you usually
(A) mingle well with others, or
(B) tend to keep more to yourself?
80. Do you prefer to
(A) wait and see what happens and then make plans, or
(B) plan things far in advance?
81. Are you
(A) easy to get to know, or'
(B) hard to get to know?
82. Do you usually prefer courses that teach
(A) concepts and principles, or
(B) facts and figures?
83. At parties do you
(A) do much of the talking, or
(B) let others do most of the talking?
84. Do your consider yourself to be
(A) more of a spontaneous person, or
(B) more of an organized person?
85. Can you keep a conversation going indefinitely
(A) only with a few people who share some interest of yours, or
(B) with almost anyone?
86. When you start a big project that is due in a week, do you
(A) take time to list the separate things to be done and the order of doing them, or

(B) plunge in?
87. Which is a higher compliment, to be called
(A) competent, or
(B) compassionate?
88. Do you find going by a schedule
(A) necessary at times but generally unfavorable, or
(B) helpful and favorable most of the time?
89. Would you rather work under a boss (or teacher) who is
(A) good-natured but often inconsistent, or
(B) sharp-tongued but always logical?
90. Overall, when working on a big assignment, do you tend to
(A) figure out what needs to be done as you go along, or
(B) begin by breaking it down into steps?
91. In social situations, do you usually find it
(A) difficult to start and maintain a conversation with some people
(B) easy to talk to most people for long periods of time?
92. Would you rather
(A) support the established methods of doing good, or
(B) analyze what is still wrong and attack unsolved problems?
93. Would you prefer to do most things according to
(A) however you feel that particular day, or
(B) a set schedule?
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Appendix H
Instructions for Participants
Hello, and welcome to this study of visual imagery, creativity, and personality
type. For this research, I am asking you to pay close attention to two series of visual
images. During the first set of images, you will view them only. During presentation of
the second set of images, you will be asked to rate each image on your preference for, or
how much you like, the image. After responding to each image in the second set, I will
present you with groups of shapes for you to combine into patterns or pictures and
several lists of words for which you will be asked to supply a fourth, related word.
Finally, I will give you four questionnaires to complete. Again, these instructions will be
repeated at the appropriate times during the study, and you may ask any questions that
you like at any time. Please sign the consent form, and we'll begin.
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Appendix I
Participant Consent Form
The general nature of this study of visual imagery, creativity, and personality,
conducted by Marlene Stemme, has been explained to me. I understand that I will be
asked to view two series of visual images, rate my preference for these images, use
supplied visual images to construct patterns and pictures, and respond to a series of
questionnaires.
I further understand that my anonymity will be preserved and that my name will
not be associated with my responses or with any of the results of this study.
I know that I may refuse to answer any question asked, and that I may discontinue
participation at any time. I also understand that any grade, payment, or credit for
participation will not be affected by my responses or by my exercising any of my rights.
I am also aware that I may report dissatisfactions with any aspect of this
experiment to the Psychology Department Chair. I am aware that I must be at least 18
years of age to participate. My signature below signifies my voluntary participation in
this study.

Date

Name

Signature

Student ID Number
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Image Ratings by Previous Exposure to Images
Mean

Std. Deviation

Gestalt subliminal

4.25

1.09

Non-gestalt subliminal

3.09

.89

Gestalt supraliminal

4.17

1.38

Non-gestalt supraliminal

3.72

1.20

Gestalt new

4.29

1.04

Non-gestalt new

3.07

.74

Gestalt subliminal

4.25

1.09

Gestalt supraliminal

4.17

1.38

Gestalt subliminal

4.25

1.09

Gestalt new

4.29

1.04

Non-gestalt subliminal

3.09

.89

Non-gestalt supraliminal

3.72

1.20

Non-gestalt subliminal

3.09

.89

Non-gestalt new

3.07

.74

Image Type (In Pairs)
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Image Preferences Among Skepticism Levels and Belief Levels
Gestalt

Non-gestalt

Skepticism
Std. Deviation

Mean

Level

Belief Level

Mean

Low

Low

3.59

High

2.92

Total

3.37

.43

3.06

.93

Low

4.41

.68

2.74

.95

High

4.49

.43

3.63

.15

Total

4.46

.46

3.27

.69

Low

4.00

.63

3.13

.81

High

4.1

.86

3.25

.76

Total

4.05

.70

3.19

.73

High

Total

.27

3.53

Std. Devia
.67

2.13
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Total Image Preferences Among Skepticism-Belief Groupings

Total Preference Ratings
Skepticism-Belief Group

Mean

Std. Deviation

Neither

5.35

.61

Skeptic

5.78

.20

Believer

3.98

Both

6.30

.50

Total

5.65

.86
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Table 4
Correlations Among Art Scale Scores and Personality Type Preferences

Art Scale Score

Personality Type Preference
Correlation

Significance (1-tailed)

Extraversion

-.36

.007

Introversion

.22

.073

Sensing

-.41

.002

Intuition

.20

.088

Thinking

-.49

.000

Feeling

.31

.017

Judging

-.39

.003

Perceiving

.22

.068

83

Figure Caption
Figure 1. Interaction of skepticism and belief on Art Scale scores.
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